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judge wide discretion in determining whether the records are
sufficiently reliable to be admitted. Business is defined broadly
enough to include commercial, industrial, professional, and non-
profit activities. It is submitted that Louisiana should consider
future legislation in order to provide a guide for admitting busi-
ness records, thereby eliminating much of the uncertainty in
this area of Louisiana law.
Robert A. Hawthorne, Jr.
Real Rights in Louisiana
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine the nature of
the real right in Louisiana in the light of the Civil Code, the
Louisiana jurisprudence, and French and common law materials.
The real right in France is apparently seen as a right held
by one person against all other persons in the world,' with the
object of the right being the thing upon which it is exercised.
As a correlative to the right, all persons owe an obligation to
abstain from disturbing the holder of the right in his enjoyment
of it. An example is the right of ownership. The owner of prop-
erty has a right against all men that they should abstain from
disturbing him in the exercise of his ownership. This right can
be asserted against all the world, and thus the owner can be said
to have rights of pursuit of the property into the hands of ad-
verse possessors, and preference over any ordinary creditor of
the possessor. Under French law, then, the rights of pursuit and
preference are the two major advantages that the holder of any
real right has over the holder of a mere personal right or right
of credit.2
The real right in Louisiana as explained in the Civil Code is
not quite so comprehensive, however. Though the Code does not
deal specifically with real rights, it is clear that the real right is
a necessary correlative of the real obligation, which is defined
as any obligation attached to immovable property.3 The char-
acteristics of a real obligation, and consequently of a real right,
form Statutes Relating to Business Entries as Evidence, 31. TUL. L. REV. 49, 54
(1956).
1. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (A TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) § 2160 (1959).
2. Id. § 2165.
3. LA. Civir, CODE art. 2010 (1870).
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are: (1) that it passes with the land in the same manner as a
right of servitude in favor of an estate passes with the estate,4
and (2) enforcement of the purely real right does not impose
personal liability upon the possessor of the immovable prop-
erty5 The property is liable, yet the possessor can relieve him-
self of all responsibility by abandoning the property to the hold-
er of the real right.( On the basis of the Code, therefore, since
mere abandonment of the property removes all responsibility
from the possessor, it seems that the exercise or vindication of a
real right should be accomplished without obtaining a personal
judgment against any person.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has announced in the case of
Reagan v. Murphy7 that a real right is synonymous with a pro-
prietary interest, and that both of these terms refer to a species
of ownership. Thus, it seems that the court has restricted the
use of the term "real right" to an interest in property as owner.,
It is submitted that this restriction is difficult to reconcile with
4. Id. arts. 2011, 2012.
5. Id. art. 2012 reads in part as follows: "Real obligations may be created in
three ways: . . .
"All these contracts give rise to obligations purely real on the part of those
who acquire the land, under whatever species of title they possess it; they are
not personally liable, but the real property is, and, by abandoning it to the obligee,
they relieve themselves from all responsibility.
6. Ibid.
7. 235 La. 529, 541, 105 So.2d 210, 214 (1958). The language in the Reagan
case that is pertinent to the subject matter of this Comment was quoted verbatim
in the case of Harwood Oil & Mining Co. v. Black, 124 So.2d 764 (La. 1960),
rehearing denied.
This language in part is as follows: " 'The rights of use, enjoyment, and dis-
posal are said to be the three elements of property in things. They constitute the
jura in re. The right of a lessee is not a real right, i.e., a jus in re. In other
words, the lessee does not hold one of the elements of property in the thing. His
right is a jus ad rem, a right upon the thing. . . .' Accordingly, it is clear that
the term 'real right' under the civil law is synonymous with proprietary interest,
both of which refer to a species of ownership. Ownership defines the relation of
man to things and may, therefore, be declared against the world. A personal right,
on the other hand, defines man's relationship to man and refers merely to an
obligation one owes to another which may be declared only against the obligor."
8. It is notable that in reaching the conclusion that a real right is synonymous
with proprietary interest, the court equated the real right to a jus in re. This is
a phrase that, according to Planiol, originated with the early French commentators
who used it to distinguish the right to property that could be enforced only through
the intervention of the debtor (jus ad ren), from the real right that was enforce-
able against all persons (jus in re). It is clear that the French definition of the
term "real right" did not restrict it to an interest as owner, but the term ius in re
has come to be so restricted. See BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). Thus
in equating the real right to the jus in re, the court reaches the logical conclusion
that the real right is the same as a proprietary interest. It seems that, though
the jus in re means ownership today, it did not originally restrict itself to that
definition, and to equate it to a real right is to change the meaning of the real
right also, perhaps unadvisedly. See 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (A TRANS-
LATION BY TE, LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) § 2166 (1959).
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the use that the court has previously made of the term,9 and
neither does it seem to follow the definition of the real right
given in the Code.
Ownership, of course, involves real rights. The owner of prop-
erty has a right to the property which can be asserted against
the world, and which is real in the sense that it can be asserted
without obtaining a personal judgment against anyone. The
owner of property who wishes to assert his title against an ad-
verse possessor brings a petitory action which results in a dec-
laration that he is the owner. 10 The adverse possessor is not per-
sonally cast in judgment, and can relieve himself of any respon-
sibility by simply abandoning the property to the owner.
The right that the owner of property has to the peaceable
possession of his property is of a different nature, however, and
calls for a different remedy. When an owner asserts his right to
peaceable possession against a trespasser, the judgment he ob-
tains is personal in nature. The trespasser is personally enjoined
from disturbing the owner, and may be compelled to pay dam-
ages." Therefore, though the right to peaceful possession is cer-
tainly an attribute of ownership, it cannot be classified as a real
right under the Civil Code because the trespasser becomes per-
sonally liable.
The right against the trespasser would clearly be classified as
a real right under the French law,12 however, and it seems that
9. See, e.g., the cases involving building restrictions where the court has said
that building restrictions are real rights and covenants running with the land.
Salerno v. De Lucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678 (1947) ; Edwards v. Wiseman,
198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941) ; LeBlanc v. Palmisano, 43 So.2d 263 (La. App.
1950).
The person who buys property subject to a building restriction never obtains
ownership of the property in its fullest sense. His rights of ownership are reduced
in some particular, depending on the nature of the restriction. Since his rights
are restricted, he comes under a duty not to do a certain thing, and this duty
necessarily creates a right in someone to demand that the owner of the property
subject to the restriction obey the restriction. Any exercise of this right results
of necessity in a judgment against the owner of the restricted property command-
ing him not to do something, or perhaps, compelling him to pay damages for the
violation of his duty. Thus it seems that this right to enforce a building restric-
tion cannot be called a real right under the Civil Code definition, since the enforce-
ment of the right results in a personal judgment against the possessor of the prop-
erty. For a detailed discussion of building restrictions, see Comment, 21 Louisx-
ANA LAW REVIEW 468 (1960).
10. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRocEDul art. 3651 (1960).
11. Geisenheimer Realty Co. v. Board of Commissioners for the Pontchartrain
Levee District, 237 La. 306, 111 So.2d 123 (1959) ; Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 204
La. 896, 16 So.2d 471 (1943). See also State v. Martin, 199 La. 39, 5 So.2d 377
(1941), for an example of a criminal action against a trespasser.
12. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (A TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) § 2160 (1959).
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it would be counted as a right in rem or a property right under
the common law.18 It seems, then, that in comparing the real
right in France with the real right under the Louisiana Civil
Code, the former includes almost any right in relation to prop-
erty that is held against all men,1 4 but the real right in Louisiana
is restricted to those rights in relation to property that can be
enforced without obtaining a personal judgment against any-
one.
15
Despite the language of the court in Reagan v. Murphy,16
indicating that a real right must involve an interest as owner, it
seems that there are some instances of real rights that do not
constitute ownership interests in property. Several illustrations
of such real rights are given in Article 2012 of the Civil Code.
For example, if there is a recorded mortgage on immovable prop-
erty' 7 and the property is acquired by a third party who has not
assumed the payment of the mortgage indebtedness, the mort-
gagee has a real right which may be enforced against the prop-
erty although no personal judgment condemning the possessor
to pay could be obtained.' 8 The real right stemming from the
recorded mortgage does not rest on an interest as owner in the
property. It is real, nevertheless, because the purchaser is not
13. See 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 860 (1951).
14. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (A TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) § 2160 (1959). Planiol's discussion of the nature of the
real right is not so restrictive as the discussion in this Comment. The analysis
contained herein is based not so much on the nature of the right as it is on the
nature of the remedy that it affords, or theoretically could afford. Planiol did not
look at the real right from this point of view, but simply considered a right against
all men generally as a real right as opposed to the personal right against a certain
person or group of persons. The same is true of the discussion of rights in rem
or property rights by Corbin. The property right that Corbin refers to is a right
in relation to property that is opposable against all men generally instead of a
specific person. These concepts are broad enough to include the rights that would
be counted as real rights under the Louisiana Civil Code, and also those rights
such as the right an owner of property holds against a trespasser. These latter
rights are denominated "real" by Planiol even though they are enforced by means
of a personal judgment.
15. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2012 (1870).
16. 235 La. 529, 541, 105 So.2d 210, 214 (1958).
17. LA. CIVII, CODE art. 3282 (1870) : "The mortgage is a real right on the
property bound for discharge of the obligation. . . ." See Schexnailder v. Fontenot,
147 La. 467, 476, 85 So. 207, 210 (1920), wherein it was said that "a mortgage,
whether conventional or judicial, imposes a real right or obligation upon the prop-
erty bound for its discharge."
18. See Gauche v. Gerdes, 10 Orl. App. 56 (La. App. 1912) to the effect that
one who purchases property subject to a mortgage, without assuming the same,
incurs no personal liability for the amount thereof, but the property itself remains
liable for the amount of the mortgage debt. On the contrary, it appears that if the
purchaser of mortgaged property assumes the payment of the mortgage debt, he
becomes personally liable to the mortgagee, in addition to the real right that the
mortgagee holds against the property. Schlatre v. Greaud, 19 La. Ann. 125 (1867).
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personally bound in the absence of an assumption of the debt
by him. In addition to mortgages, Article 2012 sets forth several
other transactions which create real obligations, and thus real
rights. Among these are a sale subject to a rent charge 9 or a
right of redemption ;20 servitudes; the right of use and habita-
tion and usufruct.21 An examination of each of these situations
indicates that they create obligations which are binding on the
property, but not on the individual who acquires the land. Each
should, therefore, be enforceable by a judgment that recognizes
the right of the obligee, and should require no personal judgment
against the possessor of the property. 22 None of these rights
stem from an interest as owner, however, but are rights arising
generally from contracts.
Another transaction which creates a real right in favor of
a non-owner is the case where the owner of property gives an
option to buy which is recorded, and the property is sold to a
third party before the option expires. As regards the grantor
of the option, the option holder has a personal right to demand
specific performance.2 3 With respect to the third purchaser,
however, the option holder has a real right.2 4 The purchaser has
taken the property subject to the option, and it seems that the
option holder, by exercising his option and bringing a petitory
action, could be declared the owner of the property. Recordation
of a judgment declaring him owner Would satisfy his claim, and
the third party who purchased the property subject to the out-
standing option would simply abandon the property to the new
owner, retaining, of course, his personal action against the
vendor.
The question concerning the nature of the right of a lessee
has been considered by the court on numerous occasions. 25
19. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2017 (1870).
20. Id. art. 2567 et ,eq.
21. Id. art. 556.
22. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1871 (1960), which provides for dec-
laratory judgments, would seem to allow Vindication of the rights of the parties
who have servitudes, etc., without obtaining a personal judgment. Simple recog-
nition of the right would seem sufficient in most cases.
23. Watson v. Bethany, 209 La. 989, 26 So.2d 12 (1946).
24. Kinberger v. Drouet, 149 La. 986, 999, 90 So. 367, 372 (1922): "A
promise of sale, duly accepted and recorded, confers a real right on the purchaser,
of which third persons are bound to take notice, and such right cannot be de-
feated by a subsequent sale of the same property recorded prior to the execution
of the deed pursuant to the promise of sale. Lehman v. Rice, 118 La. 975, 43
South. 639."
25. The leading case in this area is Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Glassell, 186
La. 190, 201, 171 So. 846, 850 (1936), where it was said: "It therefore appears
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Though the Code specifically provides that a lease is a real obli-
gation on the property,2 6 the court has consistently said that a
lessee has a personal right only.2 7 It is clear that the relation
between a lessee and his lessor is of a personal nature. The lessee
is personally bound, for example, to pay rent,28 and the lessor is
bound to guarantee the lessee peaceful possession of the prop-
erty.29 But, even though these obligations are personal, it is clear
that a purchaser of property subject to a recorded lease must
honor the rights of the lessee.80 It also seems clear that, if the
public records doctrine is given full effect,8 1 a recorded lease
should be effective against other third parties as well. 2 It there-
fore appears that, should the lessee desire to assert his right to
possession of the property, a judicial recognition of his rights as
shown on the public records should suffice to establish his claim
to possession.38  With a judgment recognizing his right to pos-
to us that an oil and gas lease and farm lease are quite alike and should be placed
in the same legal category, i.e., leases-personal rights and not real rights." Thus,
while deciding that the mineral lessee could not maintain a petitory action, the
court also made it clear that the predial lessee has only a personal right. The
proposition that a mineral lessee has only a personal right has been followed in
many cases. Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958) ; Arnold v.
Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 50, 48 So.2d 369 (1949) ; Weber v. H. G. Hill Stores, 207
La. 500, 21 So.2d 510 (1945) ; Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 181 So. 206 (La. App.
1938) ; Marchand v. Gulf Refining Co. of La., 187 La. 1002, 175 So. 647 (1937).
The legislature has enacted statutes for the purpose of classifying the right
of a mineral lessee as real, but the court has refused to accept this classification
thus far. See Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958) ; Arnold v.
Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 50, 48 So.2d 369 (1949); and LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950).
A detailed discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of this Comment.
26. LA. ClVL CODE art. 2015 (1870) : "Not only servitudes, but leases and
all other rights, which the owner had imposed on his land before the alienation of
the soil, form real obligations which accompany it in the hands of the person who
acquires it ... "
It is interesting to note that in the Projet of the Civil Code of 1825, the
word "real" was inserted before "right," thus making it clear that the intent
was that the lessee has a real right. The word was omitted from the Civil Code
of 1870, however, and it is not clear whether this was a fault in translation of
the French, or an intentional omission. See 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL AacnivEs 272
(1938) ; DART'S LA. CIVIL CODE ANN. art. 2015 (1870).
27. See cases cited in note 25 supra.
28. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2710 (1870).
29. Id. art. 2692.
30. Coyle v. Geoghegan, 187 La. 308, 174 So. 366 (1937) ; Summers and
Brannins v. Clark, 30 La. Ann. 436 (1878). See also LA. CIVIL CoDE arts. 2266,
2733 (1870).
31. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2266 (1870). See also LA. R.S. 9:2721 (1950),
which strengthens and expands the public records doctrine.
32. In Summers and Brannins v. Clark, 30 La. Ann. 436, 437 (1878), it was
said: " 'All sales, contracts, and judgments affecting immovable property which
shall not be so recorded, shall be utterly null and void, except between the par-
ties thereto.' C.C. 2266. See also C.C. 2264, which provides: 'No notarial act
concerning immovable property shall have any effect against third persons,' unless
recorded in the conveyance office. These are negatives pregnant with affirmatives
to the effect that contracts 'affecting' or 'concerning' immovables (and therefore
leases thereof), will have effect against third persons, if duly recorded ....
33. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1871 (1960).
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session, the lessee's right would be vindicated without a personal
judgment, and his right could, in this respect, be classified as
real under the Code.
In conclusion, it seems that there has never been any defi-
nitive judicial statement as to the true nature of a real right in
Louisiana. The latest position taken by the court is that a real
right is the same as an interest as owner. An examination of
the code provisions indicates, however, that the true character-
istics of the real right are: (1) that it passes with the land,34
and (2) that it does not make anyone personally liable, but is
merely a charge on the property. 5
If the court should choose to interpret real rights in strict
adherence to the terms of the Code, it seems that the position
taken in the Reagan case must be amended to include those real
rights that are not synonymous with an interest as owner. If,
however, the present position is adhered to, and a real right is
confined to those rights which constitute an interest as owner,
it would seem that another name must be found for those real
rights that are not compatible with that definition. In any event,
it seems that the position of the court as to the nature of a real
right should be clarified.
Edward C. Abell, Jr.
Building Restrictions in Louisiana
The purpose of this Comment is to examine and analyze the
Louisiana law pertaining to building restrictions.1 In this
analysis a comparison with other means of restricting the use of
property will be made.
The building restriction is a limitation on the use of prop-
erty imposed by an ancestor in title in accordance with a general
plan where the purpose is to maintain certain building standards
and uniformity in improvements. 2 The law of building restric-
tions has primarily developed from judicial decisions beginning
34. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2011 (1870).
35. Id. art. 2012.
1. See Comment, 8 TuL. L. REV. 262 (1933).
2. See Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841
(1938) ; Rabouin v. Dutrey, 181 La. 725, 160 So. 393 (1935) ; Hill v. Win. P.
Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928) ; Munson v. Berdon, 51 So.2d 157
(La. App. 1951).
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